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Abstract. We investigate a class of weighted voting games for which
weights are randomly distributed over the unit simplex. We provide
close-formed formulae for the expectation and density of the distribu-
tion of weight of the k-th largest player under the uniform distribution.
We analyze the average voting power of the k-th largest player and its
dependence on the quota, obtaining analytical and numerical results for
small values of n and a general theorem about the functional form of the
relation between the average Banzhaf power index and the quota for the
uniform measure on the simplex.
Keywords: voting power, Penrose–Banzhaf index, order statistics, ran-
dom weighted voting games
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1 Introduction
An n-player weighted voting game G can be described by a weight vector
w := (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ ∆n, where ∆n is the standard (n− 1)-dimensional unit
simplex, and a qualified majority quota q ∈ ( 12 , 1]. In such game, the set of
winning coalitionsW ⊂ P(V ), where V is the set of voters, is defined as follows:
W :=
{
C ⊂ V :
∑
v∈C
wv ≥ q
}
. (1)
The notion of voting power, i.e., a voter’s influence on the outcome of the
game, which, as demonstrated by Penrose [1], is not necessarily proportional
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to such voter’s weight, is of fundamental importance to the study of voting
systems. The two most popular voting power indices have been introduced by
Shapley and Shubik in 1954 [2] and by Banzhaf in 1964 [3]. Both define the
voting power of a voter v in terms of the probability that their vote is decisive,
but differ in their definition of the probability measure on voting outcomes: the
Shapley-Shubik index treats each permutation of voters as equiprobable, while
the Penrose–Banzhaf index assigns equal probability to each combination. In
addition, there are two versions of the Banzhaf index in common use: one is
defined as the probability of a voter v casting a decisive vote and is known as
the non-normalized or absolute Penrose–Banzhaf index, ψv [4], while the other
one, βv, is further normalized in order to ensure that the vector (β1, . . . , βn) lies
on the unit simplex ∆n. The vector of Shapley-Shubik indices always lies on ∆n,
hence there is no need for further normalization.
It is well known that each player’s voting power depends not only on the
weight vector, but also on the quota [5,6,7]. However, as demonstrated in [8],
the dependence of the Penrose–Banzhaf index on both parameters is usually
discontinuous and highly erratic, wherefore any results obtained from investi-
gating it for a fixed weight vector are apt to be influenced by number-theoretic
pecularities of that vector and therefore unsuitable for drawing more general
conclusions. We seek to avoid that problem by analyzing the dependence of the
Penrose–Banzhaf index on the quota q for a random weighted voting game, where
the ordered power index vectors are averaged over the whole simplex ∆n with
some specified probability measure P . For the simplest case of the uniform mea-
sure, we obtain exact closed-form formulae for the expectation and density of
the distribution of voting weight of the k-th largest player, a general theorem
about the functional form of the relation between the expected values of the
absolute and normalized Penrose–Banzhaf indices of the k-th largest player and
the quota, and an approximate analytical formula for the former. All of those
results constitute an original contribution of the paper. We further outline sev-
eral applications of those results in the field of mathematical voting theory and
in some other areas.
1.1 Related work
The relationship between quota and the Penrose–Banzhaf power index for a
fixed weight vector has been investigated in [9] and more generally in [8], with
the latter reporting several results on, inter alia, the upper and lower bounds of
the ratio and difference between a player’s weight and normalized Banzhaf index.
Analytical results about the values of the Penrose–Banzhaf index depending on
quota are available primarily for the extreme quotas: the Penrose limit theorem
[1,10], proven under certain technical assumptions in [11], provides that for q =
1/2, ψi(q)/ψj(q) converges to wi/wj for each i, j ∈ V as n→∞. As established
in Refs. [12,13], however, this theorem does not necessarily hold for other values
of q. On the other hand, it is easy to notice that as q → 1, ψi(q) converges
to 21−n and βi(q) converges to 1/n regardless of w. In [14,15,16] it has been
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established that q∗ := 12
(
1 +
(∑n
i=1 w
2
i
)−1)
is a good approximation of the
quota minimizing the distance ‖w − β‖2 (hence βv(q∗) ≈ wv). Therefore, if
w is uniformly distributed on ∆n, E(q
∗) ≈ 12 + 1√pin . In [17] upper bounds
have been provided for the deviation between weights and Penrose–Banzhaf
indices. Variable quotas have been considered in [4], where it has been proven
that ψv(q) averaged over a uniform distribution on (
1
2 , 1] equals wv for any
w ∈ ∆n (Theorem 6 and Corollary 3). The case of variable (but deterministic)
weights has been investigated in [18]. The relationship between the number of
dummy players (i.e., such players that βv(q) = 0) and the quota has been studied
in [19].
The case of random weights, which is of chief interest to us, has been an-
alyzed only for the Shapley-Shubik index. In Ref. [20], the issue of selecting
quotas maximizing or minimizing the Shapley-Shubik power of a given player
is analyzed, noting that testing whether a given quota does so is an NP-hard
problem. The authors also note that for a large range of quotas close to 1/2, the
Shapley-Shubik power of a small player tends to be stable and close to his or
her weight. In Ref. [21], it is established that if w is uniformly distributed on
the unit simplex, the expected ratio of the Shapley-Shubik index Sv to weight
approaches 1 as n→∞. Ref. [22] identifies certain number-theoretic artifacts in
the relationship between Sv and q when weights are drawn from a multinomial
distribution and normalized, and provides a lower bound for the expected Sv of
the smallest player. A problem similar to ours is posed in [23], where a closed-
form characterization of the Shapley values of the largest and smallest players
for w drawn from a uniform distribution on ∆n or obtained by normalizing n
independent random variables drawn from a uniform distribution is provided.
Finally, in [24] a closed-form formula is given for the Shapley-Shubik power index
in games with super-increasing weights.
Numerous works analyze weighted voting games in a variety of empirical set-
tings, including the Council of the European Union [7,9,16,25,26,27,28,29,30,31]
, the U.S. Electoral College [32,33], the International Monetary Fund [34,35],
the U.N. Security Council [36] and joint stock companies [37]. The above list of
references is by no means complete, but demonstrates that the relevance of the
subject goes far beyond purely academic.
1.2 Random weighted voting games
By random weighted voting game we understand a weighted voting game in
which the number of players n and the quota q are fixed, and the weight vector
w is drawn from the unit simplex ∆n with some probability measure P . Among
possible P -s, we distinguish the class of Dirichlet measures:
Definition 1. A Dirichlet measure Dir(α), where α := (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn+, is
a continuous probability measure that has a probability density h with respect to
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the Lebesgue measure on ∆n:
h (x1, . . . , xn) :=
1
B (α1, . . . , αn)
n∏
i=1
xαi−1i , (2)
where the normalization constant B (α1, . . . , αn) is the multivariate beta func-
tion:
B (α1, . . . , αn) :=
∏n
i=1 Γ (αi)
Γ (α)
(3)
while α :=
∑n
i=1 αi is called the concentration parameter.
Definition 2. A Dirichlet measure Dir(α) is symmetric if αi = αj for each
i, j = 1, . . . , n.
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
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Fig. 1. Density plot of a symmetric Dirichlet distribution on ∆3 with α = (3, 3, 3)
(left) and of an asymmetric Dirichlet distribution on ∆3 with α = (
32
9
, 3, 16
9
) (right).
Property 1. Let W ∼ Dir(α) and let Wi, i = 1, . . . , n, be the i-th barycenteric
coordinate of W. Then Wi ∼ Beta(αi, α−αi) and E (Wi) = αi/α [38, Sec. 2.2].
Remark 1. Note that the uniform (Lebesgue) measure on ∆n is a special case
of the Dirichlet measure with α1 = · · · = αn = 1.
Proposition 1. Let Xi ∼ Gamma(αi, 1) for i = 1, . . . , n. Then(
X1∑n
i=1Xi
, . . . ,
Xn∑n
i=1Xi
)
∼ Dir(α). (4)
For proof, see [39].
We have multiple reasons for distinguishing the Dirichlet measure. It has
several desirable theoretical properties [40, Sec. 3.4], such as neutrality :
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Definition 3. Let X := (X1, . . . , Xn) be a random vector in Rn+, and let Y be
an image of X under a mapping generated by permutating coordinates. A vector
(Y1, . . . , Yk), where k < n, is neutral in X if vectors (Y1, . . . , Yk) and(
Yk+1/
∑k
i=1 Yi, . . . , Yn/
∑k
i=1 Yi
)
are independent [41].
Proposition 2. Neutrality of all permutations of X ∈ ∆n characterizes the
Dirichlet measure on ∆n [42].
Moreover, the Dirichlet measure is frequently used in computational social
choice, as it arises in the limit of the family of Po´lya urn models [43,44,45], com-
monly used to model the distribution of voter preference profiles [46,47,48,49].
Note that in many instances of weighted voting games, weights are a function of
the preference profile of the electorate (e.g., in parliaments and other represen-
tative assemblies). The Dirichlet distribution is also commonly used in statistics,
being the conjugate prior of the multinomial distribution. Through an analogy
with the principle of insufficient reason, we further focus on symmetric Dirichlet
measures among the class of all Dirichlet measures (as we have no reason to dis-
tinguish any player a priori), and among those on the Lebesgue measure (which
is equivalent to the familar Impartial Anonymous Model used in computational
social choice theory [50,51]).
2 Voting Weight of the k-th Largest Player
2.1 Introduction
While our probability measure on∆n is symmetric, we nevertheless are interested
in distinguishing players in the random weighted voting game, only a posteriori
rather than a priori (otherwise the problem would be too trivial to merit serious
interest). Note that almost surely the coordinates of w, i.e., the voting weights
of the players, can be strictly ordered. That ordering provides a natural basis
for distinguishing the players.
Definition 4. We denote the k-th largest element of a vector x as x↓k.
We start with the simplest question: what is the expectation and density of
the distribution of voting weight of the k-th largest player in a random weighted
voting game? Let W be a random variable drawn from ∆n with the probability
measure P . While coordinates W1, . . . ,Wn can be thought of as a sample of ran-
dom variables, and W ↓k as the k-th largest order statistic of that sample, virtually
all results in that field assume that order statistics are computed for a sample
of independent variables, which is manifestly not the case for the barycentric
coordinates of a vector drawn from a simplex. For that reason, the problem can
be considered non-trivial.
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2.2 Expectations: barycenter of the asymmetric simplex
Each ordering of the components of a probability vector w, w↓1 > w
↓
2 > · · · > w↓n,
corresponds to dividing the entire simplex ∆n into n! asymmetric parts ∆˜n and
selecting one of them. If W is drawn with a uniform distribution, the random
vector W↓ = (W ↓1 ,W
↓
2 , . . . ,W
↓
n) is uniformly distributed on the asymmetric
simplex ∆˜n with vertices (1, 0, . . . , 0),
1
2 (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0),. . . ,
1
n (1, 1, . . . , 1). In the
case n = 3, the simplex ∆3 is equivalent to the equilateral triangle, while ∆˜3
corresponds to its sixth part.
The expectation of an ordered probability vector W↓ coincides with the
barycenter b of the asymmetric simplex ∆˜n. The k-th coordinate of that barycen-
ter, bk, for k = 1, . . . , n, can be expressed by the sum of harmonic numbers
Hn :=
∑n
j=1 1/j, as follows:
bk = [Hn −Hk−1]/n = 1
n
n∑
j=k
1
j
. (5)
Thus we obtain an explicit expression (valid for an arbitrary dimension n)
for the expected voting weight of the k-th largest player:
Proposition 3. If W ∼Unif (∆n), where Unif (∆n) is the uniform distribution
on ∆n (corresponding to αi = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n), then for each k = 1, . . . , n:
E(W
↓
k ) =
1
n
n∑
j=k
1
j
. (6)
For instance, in the case of n = 3 the average ordered random proba-
bility vector is E(W↓) = (11, 5, 2)/18, while in the case n = 6 one obtains
E(W↓) = (147, 87, 57, 37, 22, 10)/360. Note that for a large n the harmonic num-
bers scale as lnn+γ, where γ is the Euler–Mascheroni constant, so that the first
coordinate E(W
↓
1 ) scales as lnn/n, the median coordinate as ln 2/n, and the
smallest coordinate as 1/n2.
2.3 Densities
More generally, we have obtained the following theorem:
Theorem 1. If W ∼Unif (∆n), where Unif (∆n) is the uniform distribution on
∆n, then W
↓
k , k = 1, . . . , n, is distributed according to a continuous distribution
supported on [0, 1/k] for k > 1 and on [1/n, 1] for k = 1, with density fn,k
defined piecewise for x ∈
[
1
m+1 ,
1
m
]
, where m ∈ Z+, as:
fmn,k (x) := n(n− 1)
(
n− 1
k − 1
)min{m,n}∑
l=k
(−1)l−k
(
n− k
l − k
)
(1− lx)n−2 . (7)
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Fig. 2. Density of the distribution of the voting weight of the k-th largest of 4 players.
Proof. Only a sketch of the proof will be given here. We start with Propo-
sition 1, noting that if X1, . . . , Xn ∼ Exp (1) are independent random vari-
ables, then W ↓k
d
= X↓k/Ψ , where Ψ :=
∑n
i=1Xi. From [52] we have equality
X↓k
d
=
∑n
j=k Zj/j,where Zi, . . . , Zn ∼ Exp (1) are independent pairwise and of
X1, . . . , Xn, which we use to obtain a characteristic function ofX
↓
k . Then through
contour integration and residue theorem we obtain the density of X↓k :
fX↓k
(x) = k
(
n
k
)
e−kx
(
1− e−x)n−k , (8)
for x ∈ [0,∞). The conditional characteristic function of Ψ − X↓k given X↓k is
easy to obtain when we note that it is simply a characteristic function of a sum
of n−k random variables distributed according to Exp (1) truncated from above
at X↓k , and of k−1 random variables distributed according to Exp (1) truncated
from below at X↓k . We then use a well-known formula from [53, Eq. (6)] to obtain
the joint characteristic function of X↓k and Ψ , ϕX↓k ,Ψ , and we obtain the density
of the ratio X↓k/Ψ through a result by [54]:
fW↓k
(x) =
1
pi
∫ ∞
0
=
(
∂
∂t
ϕX↓k ,Ψ
(s, t)
∣∣∣∣
t=−sx
)
ds. (9)
By computing this integral, we now obtain Eq. (7).
Remark 2. Elementary techniques of real analysis are sufficient to demonstrate
that fn,k is smooth of class C
n−3 for n > 2.
Remark 3. Theorem 1 extends an earlier result from [55], where, inter alia,
closed-form formulae are obtained for the joint density of a sum and maximum
of exponentially distributed i.i.d. random variables and thence for the density of
W ↓1 .
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3 Voting Power of the k-th Largest Player
3.1 Definitions
The notion of a power index serves to characterize the a priori voting power
of a player in a weighted voting game by measuring the probability that his
vote will be decisive in a hypothetical ballot: the winning coalition would fail
to satisfy the qualified majority condition if this player were to change his vote.
In the classical approach by Penrose [1,10] and Banzhaf [3] it is assumed that
all potential coalitions of voters are equally likely. To compute the resulting
Penrose–Banzhaf index one has to enumerate all possible coalitions, and for
each player find the number of cases in which his vote is decisive.
Let ω < 2n be the total number of all winning coalitions (i.e. such coalitions
that satisfy the necessary condition of qualified majority) and ωi the number of
winning coalitions that include the i-th player.
Definition 5. The absolute Penrose–Banzhaf index ψk of the i–th voter, where
i = 1, . . . , n, is defined in the following way:
ψi :=
ωi − (ω − ωi)
2n−1
=
2ωi − ω
2n−1
. (10)
To compare these indices for decision bodies consisting of different number
of players, it is convenient to define the normalized Banzhaf index :
Definition 6. The normalized Banzhaf index index βk of the i–th voter, where
i = 1, . . . , n, is
βi :=
ψi∑n
j=1 ψj
. (11)
The main feature of the absolute index is a clear probabilistic interpretation,
while the main feature of the normalized index consists of the fact that vector
β always lies in the probability simplex ∆n.
3.2 Computation of power indices
Power indices are known to be difficult to compute. It has been established in
[56], and more generally in [57], that the problem of computing either of the two
standard power indices is NP-complete in a generic case. Exact solutions include
a direct enumeration of all winning coalitions (which runs in exponential time),
a partitioning algorithm of [58] (likewise exponential), and the method of generat-
ing functions [59,60,61,62], which runs in polynomial time, but requires weights
to be rational. Among approximation methods, the normal approximation, de-
veloped in [63] and drawing on the method of multilinear extensions [64,65,66],
will be of particular interest to us. Other approximations include those based on
Monte Carlo techniques [67,68,69], and hybrid methods proposed in [70,71,72].
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3.3 Analytical results for very small values of n
Let Dn be the set of all n-player weighted voting game (up to isomorphism). For
small values of n, such games can be easily enumerated – see [73,74,75] and more
generally [76,77,78]. Their number increases rapidly with n: in a symmetric case,
there are 2 distinct games for the case of 2 players, 5 games for 3 players, 14 for
4 players, 62 for 5 players, 566 for 6 players, and 11971 for the case of 7 players.
For each p ∈ Dn there exists a set of polytopes Θp of dimension n − 1 such
that for any two points within θp :=
⋃
Θp the power index vectors (β
↓
1, ..., β
↓
n)
are identical and equal (βp1, ..., β
p
n). Note that the volume of θp depends on the
choice of the quota q. Now let P be a probability measure on the unit simplex
from which the weight vectors are drawn. The expected voting power of the k-th
largest player equals:
E
(
β↓k
)
=
∑
p∈Dn
βpk
∫
θp
dP. (12)
We can use Eq. (12) to obtain a formula for the expected power index of the k-
th largest player as functions of the quota q. The case of n = 2 is straightforward,
as there are only two distinct games with
(
β↓1, β
↓
2
)
equal to, respectively, (1, 0)
and ( 12 ,
1
2 ). For the uniform measure we get:
E
(
β↓1
)
= 2
1
2
∫ q
1
2
dP + 2
∫ 1
q
dP =
3
2
− q, (13a)
E
(
β↓2
)
= 2
1
2
∫ q
1
2
dP = q − 1
2
. (13b)
Let us now consider the simplest non-trivial case – that of n = 3. There are
five possible games to consider:
β↓1 β
↓
2 β
↓
3 condition probability
1/3 1/3 1/3 q > w↓1 + w
↓
2 1− F3(1− q)
1/2 1/2 0 w↓1 + w
↓
2 > q > w
↓
1 + w
↓
3 F3(1− q)− F2(1− q)
3/5 1/5 1/5
(w↓1 + w
↓
3 > q > w
↓
2 + w
↓
3)
∧ (w↓1 + w↓3 > q > w↓1)
(1− F1(1− q))F1(q)
−F1(1− q)(1− F1(q))
−1 + F2(1− q)
1 0 0 (q < w↓1) ∧ (w↓1 > 1/2) 1− F1(q)
1/3 1/3 1/3 (q < w↓2 + w
↓
3) ∧ (w↓1 < 1/2) F1(1− q)
By Fk in the above table we denote the cumulative distribution function of
the k-th largest player’s weight, k = 1, 2, 3. From the above and Eq. (7), we
obtain the following probabilities:
β↓1 β
↓
2 β
↓
3 Pr(β | q ≤ 2/3) Pr(β | q ≥ 2/3)
1/3 1/3 1/3 9q2 − 12q + 4 9q2 − 12q + 4
1/2 1/2 0 12q2 − 12q + 3 −15q2 + 24q − 9
3/5 1/5 1/5 −24q2 + 30q − 9 3q2 − 6q + 3
1 0 0 3q2 − 6q + 3 3q2 − 6q + 3
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At this point, from Eq. (12) we obtain:
E[β↓1] =
{
12
5 (q − q2) + 130 , q ≤ 2/3
1
10 (16− 16q + 3q2) + 130 , q ≥ 2/3
, (14a)
E[β↓2] =
{
21
5 q
2 − 4q + 1 + 130 , q ≤ 2/3
1
10 (68q − 39q2 + 26), q ≥ 2/3
, (14b)
E[β↓3] =
{
− 95q2 + 2q − 12 + 130 , q ≤ 2/3
2
5 (9q
2 − 13q) + 2 + 130 , q ≥ 2/3
. (14c)
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
q
Pr(β|q)
Fig. 3. Probabilities of the four possible power distributions for n = 3 as a function of
the threshold q: (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), (1/2, 1/2, 0), (3/5, 1/5, 1/5), (1, 0, 0).
3.4 Numerical results for small values of n
As mentioned in Sec. 1, if a player’s voting weight is fixed, the dependence
of the power index on the quota q ∈ [ 12 , 1) is highly erratic. The problem is
illustrated by Fig. 4, plotting the dependence of the normalized Banzhaf in-
dex β on q in a six-player game with voting weights fixed at the coefficients
b6 = (147, 87, 57, 37, 22, 10)/360 of the barycenter of the asymmetric simplex
∆˜6, which describes an ordered vector w
↓ averaged over ∆6 with respect to the
uniform measure.
For the standard majority, q = 50%, the voting power β1 of the largest player
A is much larger than his voting weight, b1 = 147/360 ≈ 40.8%. This is at the
expense of the second largest player B, whose voting power is much smaller
than his voting weight b2 = 87/360 ≈ 24.2% and is equal to the voting power of
the third owner, β2 = β3. For larger quota q, the voting power of B increases,
so that β2 becomes equal to β1, as his votes become indispensable to form a
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Fig. 4. Banzhaf power index β of six typical players A,B, . . . , F as a function of the
quota q. Horizontal lines represent the voting weights of each player.
winning coalition. The dependence of the Banzhaf index βi on the quota q is
non–monotonic also for other players.
Let us now consider a random voting game with the uniform measure on ∆n.
Let 〈β↓k〉 be the expected voting power of the k-th largest player, k = 1, ..., n.
On Fig. 5 we plot a numerical estimate of 〈β↓k〉 as a function of q, obtained by
Monte Carlo sampling of 216 random vectors of length n = 6.
X1
b3 ≈0.16
b2 ≈0.24
b1 ≈0.41
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.
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q6
*
≈0.73
q
βi↓
X1
b3 ≈0.16
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0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7 n=6q6
*
≈0.73
q [%]
ψi[%]
Fig. 5. Absolute and normalized Penrose–Banzhaf power indices, ψ and β, of six players
averaged over the probability simplex with respect to the uniform measure as a function
of the quota q. Horizontal lines represent the average voting weight of each player, and
the vertical one represents the optimal quota q∗ for which the distance ‖w − β‖2 is
minimized.
In the case of the standard majority, q = 1/2, the average voting power of
the largest player, 〈β↓1(1/2)〉 ≈ 54%, is much larger than his average weight
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〈w↓1〉 ≈ 40.8%, at the expense of all other players. At this quota, the second
player loses (on average) the most, but his average voting power 〈β↓2〉 grows with
q. This occurs up to q2 ≈ 77%, at the expense of the third player, whose mean
voting power initially decreases with q and then grows rapidly for q ∈ (q2, q3),
with q3 ≈ 88%. For even larger values of the quota q, the voting power of the
remaining smaller players also increases, and for the maximal quota, q = 100%,
the voting powers of all players become equal,
〈
β↓k
〉
= 1/6 for k = 1, . . . , 6.
Note that the average Banzhaf indices of the two smallest players fluctuate
mildly with q around the horizontal lines representing the components b5 and
b6 of the barycenter b
6 of the asymmetric simplex ∆˜6. For these players their
average voting power is practically proportional to their voting weights.
The same pattern appears for an arbitrary number of players: the average
voting power of the largest player is initially considerably larger than his voting
weight and decreases monotonously with the quota – see Fig. 6. The average
power of the second player has a single maximum at q2, which depends on n.
For subsequent players average Banzhaf indexes fluctuate with the quota, but
the amplitudes of the fluctuations diminish as k increases.
X1
b3 ≈0.11
b2 ≈0.28
b1 ≈0.61
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8 n=3q3* ≈0.83
q
βi↓
X1
b3 ≈0.15
b2 ≈0.20
b1 ≈0.31
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4 n=9q9
*
≈0.69
q
βi↓
Fig. 6. As in Fig. 5 for n = 3 (left) and n = 9 (right).
3.5 Normal approximation for large values of n
For larger values of n, numerical simulations are no longer feasible. However, it
becomes possible to use another technique, namely the normal approximation,
to obtain not only numerical results, but analytic (if approximate) formula for
the absolute Penrose–Banzhaf index of the k-th largest power.
The normal approximation of the non-normalized Banzhaf index is based on
the fact that as n → ∞, the distribution of coalition weights converges to the
normal distribution with parameters µ := 12
∑n
j=1 wi =
1
2 , and σ
2 := 14
∑n
j=1 w
2
i .
Similarly, the distribution of weights of the coalitions formed by V \v converges to
the normal distribution with parameters µv :=
1
2
(∑n
j=1 wi − wv
)
= 12 (1−wv),
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and σ2v :=
1
4
(∑n
j=1 w
2
j − w2v
)
. As a player’s vote is decisive if and only if the
total weight of a coalition wC satisfies q − wv ≤ wC < q, we can express the
probability of a player being pivotal in terms of a difference of two normal CDFs
Φ:
ψi ≈ Φ
(
q − µj
σj
)
− Φ
(
q − µj − wj
σj
)
. (15)
Now let fk,n be the density of the distribution of the voting weight of the k-
th largest player given by Eq. (7), and let gk,n be the conditional density of
the distribution of the sum of squares of voting weights of all players given the
voting weight of the k-th largest player (for very large values of n, the latter can
be approximated by the unconditional density of the distribution of the sum of
squares of voting weights of all players). Then the expected voting power of the
k-th largest player is given by:
E
(
ψ↓k
)
≈
∫ 1
0
fk,n (x)
∫ 1
0
gk,n (y, x)
(
Φ
(
2q − x√
y − x2
)
− Φ
(
2q − 3x√
y − x2
))
dy dx.
(16)
As noted by [15], for q close to the inflection point of the normal cumulative
distribution function, this can be further approximated by
E
(
ψ↓k
)
≈
∫ 1
0
fk,n (x)
∫ 1
0
gk,n (y, x) Φ
′
( √
y√
y − x2
)
x
1
2
√
y − x2 dy dx = (17)
=
1√
2pi
∫ 1
0
fk,n (x)
∫ 1
0
gk,n (y, x)
2x√
y − x2 exp
(
2y
x2 − y
)
dy dx. (18)
Remark 4. Normal approximation is only valid for the absolute Penrose–Banzhaf
index. Nevertheless, it might be possible to approximate the expected normaliza-
tion value using the Coleman efficiency coefficient Q, i.e., the probability that a
randomly chosen coalition is a winning one [79]. In investigating that possibility
we have established that in a weighted voting game with q ≥ 1/2, the Coleman
efficiency coefficient is bounded from the above:
Q ≤ exp
(
−2(q − 1/2)
2∑n
i=1 w
2
i
)
. (19)
A proof follows from the Hoeffding’s inequality [80].
3.6 Splines
The following theorem describes the functional form of the relation between the
expected Penrose–Banzhaf indices of the k-th largest player and the quota:
Theorem 2. If the weight vector w := (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ ∆n is uniformly dis-
tributed, the absolute and normalized Banzhaf power indices of the k-th largest
voter, ψ↓k (q) and β
↓
k (q), are splines of degree n − 1 for each k = 1, ..., n and
q ∈ ( 12 , 1].
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Proof (Outline). Note that for each k = 1, ..., n and any fixed q, β↓k(q) is a linear
combination of the volumes of one or more subsets of ∆n, and the boundaries
of each of those subsets vary linearly (or piecewise linearly) with q. Under the
flat measure on the simplex, the volume of each subset of interest is equal to its
Lebesgue measure, which is a polynomial of degree n − 1. Accordingly, β↓k is a
spline of degree n− 1. The proof for ψ↓k proceeds analogously.
Also, numerical results presented above suggest a following conjecture:
Conjecture 1. For the uniform distribution on the unit simplex, the normalized
Banzhaf power index of the k-th voter β↓k (q) has exactly k − 1 extremes over
(1/2, 1) for every k = 1, ..., n.
Remark 5. Note that for n = 3, Conjecture 1 follows immediately from the
analytic form of E[β
↓(q)] given by Eq. (14). For k = 2 we have a maximum at
34/39 (≈ 87.18%), and for k = 3 we have a minimum at 5/9 (≈ 55.56%) and a
maximum at 13/18 (≈ 72.22%).
4 Potential Applications and Future Work
The results presented above enhance our understanding of the relationship be-
tween the quota and the voting power in a random voting game by minimizing
the noise resulting from number-theoretic pecularities. They can have potential
applications in the area of voting rule design, especially if the rules are drafted
behind a veil of ignorance with regard to the actual distribution of players’
weights (as is the case for business corporations). Moreover, the results pre-
sented in Sec. 2, regarding the expectation and distribution of voting weights of
the k-th largest player, may find applications in other areas of computational
social choice and mathematical voting theory. For instance, Theorem 1 can be
easily applied to obtain the probability of a candidate with a specified vote share
winning the election held under the plurality rule.
Future work will focus on proving Conjecture 1; improving the large-n ap-
proximation and extending it for the normalized Banzhaf index; and generalizing
the results for other Dirichlet measures.
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